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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940244-CA 
v. : 
ROGER L. STRADER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
APPELLEE'S RESPONSE TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has either "misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or facts, 
or ha[s] overlooked some statute or decision which may affect the 
result" of the case. See Cummins v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 
120 P. 619, 625 (1913) . Defendant fails to identify a problem 
affecting the result of his appeal or to establish that he is 
otherwise entitled to a rehearing. The majority's failure to 
include an express ruling on the theft charge in its opinion may be 
remedied without the need for a formal rehearing because the 
panel's position on the issue is clear on the face of the opinion. 
Further, defendant fails to establish the claimed constitutional 
violations arising from the court's novel analysis of his 
"atypical" claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY DIFFICULTY WITH THE MAJORITY'S FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE 
THEFT CHARGE IN ITS PUBLISHED DECISION MAY BE CURED BY THIS 
COURT WITHOUT A FULL REHEARING WHERE THE PANEL'S POSITION ON 
THE THEFT ISSUE IS CLEAR ON THE FACE OF THE OPINION 
Defendant first takes issue with the way the majority 
framed the issue before it. The majority determined that 
11
 [b] ecause the theft charge was ultimately dismissed as part of the 
plea arrangement, the sole issue for our consideration is whether 
the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of 
possession of a controlled substance . . . ." State v. Strader, 
No. 940244-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. August 31, 1995) (attached 
as Exhibit A) . Defendant argues that he is also entitled to a 
ruling on the trial court's refusal to dismiss the theft charge, 
even though that charge was ultimately dismissed as part of the 
conditional guilty plea entered below pursuant to State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) . Petition for Rehearing thereinafter 
"Petition"] at 3-5. He argues that the Court's failure to provide 
a ruling prejudices him because, had he prevailed on appeal, the 
conditional guilty plea below would have been withdrawn, leaving 
the possession charge dismissed pursuant to the appellate ruling 
and the theft charge in tact because no ruling was made. Id. at 3-
4. However, because defendant did not prevail on appeal, he has 
not suffered the claimed prejudice and is not entitled to a 
rehearing. 
Moreover, while defendant's point may warrant 
clarification by means of an amended opinion or by withdrawal from 
2 
publication, the claim does not warrant a full rehearing, as 
defendant requests. Petition at 5. The appellate panel did not 
include the theft charge in its ultimate conclusion, but its 
position relative to the charge was clear: 
Strader's conduct in giving the incorrect name and a 
falsified driver's license to Officer Randall is not 
incident to his possession of a controlled substance or, 
for that matter, to his accomplishing the theft of the 
saw, 
Strader, slip op. at 8. 
[B]ecause there was no common criminal purpose, the 
offense of false identification and the other offenses 
with which Strader was charged, in particular the drug 
offense to which he pled guilty, are not part of the same 
criminal episode. . . ." 
Id. at 9. 
[G]iving false information to a police officer is simply 
not part of a single criminal episode involving the theft 
and drug offenses under the definition set out in section 
76-1-401. (opinion at 11, concurring). 
Id. at 11 (Davis, A.J., concurring). As the panel recognized, 
where offenses are not part of the same criminal episode, none of 
the statutes upon which defendant bases his appeal are applicable. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§76-1-401, 76-1-502(1), 76-1-403 (1) (a) (1995); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(a), (b) (attached as Addendum B). Thus, 
the panel unanimously believed that the theft charge, like the 
possession charge, was not barred by the previous prosecution for 
providing false information. Consequently, the result of "the 
appeal would not change, and a rehearing to elaborate on this issue 
is not warranted. 
3 
POINT II 
THE MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS IS APPROPRIATELY BASED ON THE 
CLAIM BEFORE IT AND DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN 
LITIGANTS; FURTHER, BOTH THE MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS AND 
DEFENDANT'S MORE "EXPANSIVE" ANALYSIS PROVIDE THE SAME 
RESULT 
Taking his cue from the concurring opinion, defendant 
argues that the Court should revisit this case because the majority 
opinion utilizes a "double standard" in its interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401(2) and 76-1-403(1) (1995). Petition at 5-9. 
He claims that the majority's bifurcated standard violates his 
equal protection rights because it accords disparate treatment to 
two classes of litigants: defendants and prosecutors. Id. at 7. 
To the contrary, the majority's analysis distinguishes 
primarily between the claims presented to the court, not the party 
presenting them. The majority opinion initially addressed itself 
to two types of claims: those involving typical joinder challenges 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402(2) and 76-1-403(1) (1995), and 
those involving double jeopardy. Strader, slip op. at 4-7. The 
latter category of claim, in which defendants seek a bar to 
multiple prosecutions, focuses on whether multiple trials involve 
"the same offense" and receives a "very narrow" review, which 
defendant does not challenge. Id. at 6. The former category, in 
which defendants generally seek severance and occasionally seek 
joinder of charges, focuses on the broader concept of "single 
criminal episode" and, accordingly, receives a more expansive 
interpretation relative to the double jeopardy claims. Id. at 5-6. 
As the majority pointed out, an expansive analysis in cases 
4 
contesting joinder promotes the general joinder intent of the 
legislature. Id. However, defendant presented neither of these 
types of claims. Instead, he offered a hybrid, citing to the 
joinder statutes, but seeking to bar prosecution of two charges. 
Id. at 6. It is because of the hybrid claim that the majority 
created an intermediate level of review, making a legitimate 
distinction between claims which bar further prosecution and those 
which merely bifurcate prosecution. Moreover, the intermediate 
level of review serves to promote the same general joinder intent 
as is involved in claims contesting joinder. Id. 
The majority's analysis has not been used before in this 
jurisdiction, and neither party briefed this case under that 
analysis. Instead, the parties focused on interpreting the 
statutes in the manner advocated in the concurring opinion. 
Regardless of the approach used, the result is the same. As 
established in the State's brief and in the concurring opinion, 
giving false information to a police officer, theft and possession, 
as occurred in this case, are not part of a single criminal episode 
even under the expansive reading defendant advocates. Consequently, 
in this case the majority's analysis neither subverted the 
legislature's statutory guidelines for joinder nor inappropriately 
subjected defendant to "multiple prosecutions in multiple forums," 
as he complains. Petition at 8. 
The majority decision appropriately tailors judicial 
review to the novel challenge defendant raises to a particular type 
of charging situation and does not treat defendant in an arbitrary 
5 
fashion. Defendant has established neither an equal protection nor 
a due process violation, and his petition should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Because defendant has failed to demonstrate his claims of 
equal protection and due process violations, and has failed to 
establish any problem that affects the result of his appeal, his 
petition for rehearing should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /V day of October, 1995 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney^ 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. AUG 3 f ggg 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COURT OF APPFAI < 
• 00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Case No. 940244-CA v. 
Roger L. Strader, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
F I L E D 
(August 31, 1995) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Glenn K. Ivasaki 
Attorneys: Robert K. Heineman and David P.S. Mack, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Kris Leonard and Jan Graham, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Jackson. 
ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Roger L. Strader pled guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1994), but retained his right to appeal the trial 
court's denial of his motion to dismiss. See State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). Strader claims on appeal that 
his prior prosecution on a different charge arising from the same 
criminal episode precludes his prosecution for possession of a 
controlled substance. We affirm. 
FACTS 
The facts of this case are undisputed. On the night of July 
21, 1992, Officer Jerry Randall of the West Valley Police 
Department was preparing paperwork while sitting in his patrol 
car in a parking lot at 3900 West and 3*390 South. At 
approximately 11:00 p.m., he observed a vehicle pull into an 
adjacent construction site. A man, later identified as Strader, 
exited the vehicle, entered a building on the siter returned 
carrying an object which he placed in the vehicle, and drove 
away. Officer Randall stopped the vehicle and asked Strader, who 
was driving, for identification. 
Strader stated he had no identification, but gave his name 
as Stanley Kent Strader. After Officer Randall questioned him 
about the object in the back seat, a circular saw, Strader said 
he was picking it up for a friend named Tony Ochoa. Strader's 
female passenger left the scene to retrieve his identification 
from their nearby apartment. Another man, professing to be Tony 
Ochoa, returned with a driver's license issued to Earl Nesbitt, 
which contained a picture resembling Strader. However, the 
license had obviously been altered. The top lamination layer had 
been peeled back to allow insertion of Strader's picture. 
Officer Randall placed Strader under arrest for giving false 
information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1995). After a check on 
the vehicle's license plates revealed that the plates belonged to 
another vehicle, Officer Randall impounded the vehicle. In the 
course of the ensuing inventory search, Officer Randall found a 
loaded syringe under the driver's seat and a packet of syringes 
in the glove compartment. A canine unit discovered another 
syringe under a seat cover. Subsequent tests revealed that some 
of the syringes contained methamphetamine. Meanwhile, another 
officer found the owner of the circular saw, who identified it as 
property stolen from him. 
Strader was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on three 
charges: giving false identification to a police officer, a 
class C misdemeanor; theft, a class A misdemeanor; and possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. He was 
subsequently charged by the West Valley City prosecutor with the 
misdemeanor false identification offense. He entered a guilty 
plea to this charge, in Circuit Court, on September 3, 1992. 
The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office later filed charges 
for all three offenses. At his arraignment in Third District 
Court on September 27, 1993, Strader entered a plea of not 
guilty•• Two months later, he filed a motion to dismiss all 
charges. The court held a hearing on the motion, at which time 
it dismissed the charge for false identification because the. same 
charge had already been prosecuted in Circuit Court the previous 
year. The court declined to dismiss the remaining counts for 
theft and possession of a controlled substance. The following 
month, pursuant to a plea agreement, the court dismissed the 
theft charge and Strader changed his plea to guilty on the 
possession charge. However, Strader reserved his right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to dismiss all charges pursuant to State 
v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). 
940244-CA 2 
In its findings and conclusions issued March 9, 1994, the 
trial court determined that Strader's act of giving false 
identification to a police officer was not part of the same 
criminal episode, as defined by Utah Code Ann. 5 76-1-401 (1995), 
as the other offenses of theft and possession of a controlled 
substance.1 Strader now appeals from the trial court's refusal, 
premised on that conclusion, to dismiss all charges. 
ISSUE 
Because the theft charge was ultimately dismissed as part of 
the plea arrangement, the sole issue for our consideration is 
whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge 
of possession of a controlled substance, based on its 
determination that the charge did not arise from the same 
criminal episode as the previously prosecuted charge of giving 
false identification to a police officer.2 
1. The trial court made, inter alia, the following conclusions 
of law: 
3. The defendant gave the false name to the 
police officer before the drugs were 
discovered and before the theft had been 
confirmed. The defendant, by giving a false 
name may have been trying to escape 
apprehension by the officer but this action 
did not have the same criminal objective and 
was not related to the theft or the 
possession of drugs. 
4. The false identification to a police 
officer, theft and possession of a controlled 
substance charges were not part of a single 
criminal episode as defined by S 76-1-401 
. . . . There was not a single criminal 
objective and they are [subject to] different 
statutes, have different elements, would be 
prosecuted by different jurisdictions and 
have different penalties. 
2. For purposes of illustration and analysis, we will 
nonetheless refer to the theft charge later in this opinion in 
the context of examining the relationship of the three offenses 
to each other. Strader also argues that the inclusion of all 
three charges in a single information must be taken as an 
admission by the State that all were part of a single criminal 
episode. This argument is without merit and we decline to 
address it. SSS State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 88^-89 (Utah 
1989); State v. Range!, 866 P.2d 607, 611 n.3 (Utah App. 1993). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The "trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of latf," Ward v. Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 
1990), and thus is reviewed for correctness and accorded no 
particular deference. See ij|.; Salt Lake Citv v. Emerson, 861 
P.2d 443, 445 (Utah App. 1993). 
ANALYSIS 
1. Applicable Lav 
Our starting point is the two-prong definition of ^ j^ bngle 
criminal episode" found in the Utah Criminal Code: "all conduct 
which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or 
an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995) (emphasis added). 
If multiple offenses meet the definition of a single 
criminal episode, the applicable charges must "be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with 
the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged . . . 
[and] may not be separated except by order of the court and for 
good cause shown." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(a), (b). 
Additionally, there are two statutes pertinent to joinder of 
offenses. If multiple charges result from the same criminal 
episode, a defendant cannot be subject to separate trials "unless 
the court otherwise orders to promote justice." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402(2) (1995). If a defendant has already been prosecuted 
for an offense, he or she cannot be prosecuted subsequently for 
another offense arising out of the same criminal episode, so long 
as the later offense "was or should have been tried under 
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution." Jd. § 76-1-
403(1)(a). However, neither Rule 9.5 nor the referenced statutes 
apply if the offenses at issue are not part of the same criminal 
episode, in which case a defendant may be properly prosecuted in 
separate proceedings. 
2. Scope of Analysis 
Strader's appeal is somewhat atypical. It is not the usual 
defendant who clamors for all pending charges against him to be 
tried together before the same jury. The conventional wisdom 
holds that a jury will consider a charge more fairly if untainted 
by hearing the details of an entire series of charges pending 
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against the defendant.3 In cases determining joinder issues, 
defendants typically contest joinder by attempting to show the 
offenses did not arise from a single criminal episode and, thus, 
that their severance and separate trial motions should have been 
granted. 
In contesting the separate prosecution of his offenses, 
Strader contends the false information offense was part of the 
same episode as the theft and drug possession offenses. 
Emphasizing that he claims violation of the joinder provisions 
found in section 76-1-402(2), section 76-1-403(1)(a), and Rule 
9.5(1) rather than a violation of the constitutional double 
jeopardy doctrine, Strader argues that ve should take an 
expansive view in analyzing whether the multiple offenses indeed 
arise from the same criminal episode. As Strader recognizes, the 
opposing interpretive model is that suggested by double jeopardy 
cases, in which a rather restrictive interpretation is given to 
the key term "same offence.11 U.S. Const, amend. V. As is 
hereafter explained, neither of these approaches is wholly 
appropriate to Strader's,claim. 
An expansive interpretation of "single criminal episode19 is 
appropriate in cases contesting joinder of multiple offenses. 
Rule 9.5, section 76-1-402(2), and section 76-1-403(1), while 
related to double jeopardy,4 expand the scope of offenses barred 
from multiple trials beyond "the same offense" focus in double 
jeopardy, s&& State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 1987), 
to all offenses arising from a "single criminal episode."5 An 
expansive interpretation promotes the general joinder intent of 
Rule 9.5 and relevant statutes, i.e., to avoid subjecting the 
3. Indeed, a cynic might suggest that if the three charges 
would have been brought together initially, Strader would have 
moved to sever, arguing that the three offenses were completely 
distinct wrongs and that he would be prejudiced if they were all 
tried together. 
4. Both statutes are found in Part 4 of the Criminal Code, 
entitled "Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy." Strader's 
counsel noted during the hearing that a double jeopardy argument 
was "closely related but a different beast than the one we're 
talking about here." 
5. This court has stated that cases considering whether 
offenses "are separate for double jeopardy purposes" are not 
applicable in single episode cases contesting the court's 
decision to join offenses or deny a motion for severance. State 
v. Looez. 789 P.2d 39, 44 (Utah App. 1990). 
940244-CA 5 
defendant to separate trials and to promote judicial economy.6 
See State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Gotfrev. 598 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1979). Also, because 
appellate courts review decisions regarding joinder or severance 
of offenses only for an abuse of discretion, Germonto. 868 P.2d 
at 59; State v. Hacra. 735 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1987), it follows 
that the reviewing court would, as a practical matter, take a 
broad view of what constitutes a single criminal episode in that 
context. 
On the other hand, the protection against double jeopardy is 
a fundamental constitutional right which prevents a defendant 
from being tried more than once for the same crime. U.S. Const, 
amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, S 12. Accordingly, review of a 
double jeopardy issue employs a very narrow perspective, focusing 
on whether a subsequent prosecution is for the same offense 
without regard to whether multiple offenses were part of the same 
criminal episode. See State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 
1985) (holding successive burglaries of different areas in one 
apartment complex did not comprise the same offense); State v. 
Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (holding car 
theft and failure to stop after traffic violation were distinct 
offenses not subject to double jeopardy analysis). See also 
State v. James. 631 P.2d 854, 856 (Utah 1981) (holding double 
jeopardy does not prevent multiple convictions for multiple 
offenses arising out of single criminal episode)• 
On balance, the circumstances of Strader's claim place this 
case closer to a double jeopardy analysis than to a joinder of 
offenses analysis.7 He contends that a previous prosecution for 
6. Conversely, the trial court has discretion to order separate 
proceedings for offenses arising from the same criminal episode 
"to promote justice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2), and "for good 
cause shown." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(b). For example, severing 
the offenses may be appropriate if joinder would unduly prejudice 
a defendant and jeopardize his or her right to due process, gee 
State ^. McCumber. 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980). 
^ 7. Thus, the cases upon which Strader relies are unpersuasive 
because they are of the genre contesting joinder. In state v. 
Germonto. 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), the defendant contested 
joinder of forgery with the charges of murder and robbery. The 
Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's denial of the 
defendant's severance motion, held that because the forged checks 
were stolen from the victim during the murder and robbery, all 
three offenses had the common criminal objective of obtaining 
property from the victim. X£. at 59. Other cases jsited by 
(continued...) 
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one offense bars the subsequent prosecution of a different 
offense because both are part of the same criminal episode. Such 
a claim is comparable to assertingVdouble jeopardy bars a 
subsequent prosecution because both proceedings would involve the 
same offense. Accordingly, although our focus must be on the 
inherently broader term "criminal episode," in the unique posture 
of defendant's case we believe it is appropriate to take a 
narrow, rather than an expansive, view of what that term entails. 
3. Application to Facts 
As stated above, "all conduct which is closely related in 
time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a 
single criminal objective11 comprises a single criminal episode. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-401 (1995). There is no question, nor do 
the parties dispute, that both offenses pertinent here satisfied 
the temporal requirement of section 76-1-401. Officer Randall 
found the illegal controlled substance during a search conducted 
pursuant to and immediately after Strader's arrest for giving 
false identification. Accordingly, we limit our examination to 
the second prong of the statutory definition of a single criminal 
episode, i.e., whether the offenses for which Strader was charged 
were incident to the accomplishment of the same criminal 
objective. 
Whether the charge for false identification was incident to 
the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as the charge 
for possession of a controlled substance depends on the specific 
facts of the case viewed under to the totality of the 
circumstances.* Additionally, the totality of facts and 
7. (...continued) 
Strader are similarly inapplicable because they uphold the trial 
court's decision to join offenses for trial on the rationale that 
they were all part of a single criminal episode. See State v. 
McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 633 (Utah 1988) (eight charges for sale of 
a controlled substance); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 
App. 1990) (murder and child abuse); In re R.D.S.. 777 P.2d 532, 
538 (Utah App 1989) (kidnapping, child abuse, and homicide), 
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1990). Finally, in state -r. 
Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989), the Court considered "single 
criminal episode" in the context of admissibility of evidence 
rather than joinder or severance of offenses. I£. at 1141. 
8. The totality of circumstances approach is employed in a 
variety of criminal law contexts. See; e.g.. state v. Mabe, 864 
p.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1993) (determining whether confession was 
voluntary under totality of circumstances); State v. Case, 884 
(continued...) 
940244-CA 7 
circumstances is viewed objectively to determine whether there 
exists a common criminal objective. It would be inappropriate to 
decide the question based on whatever subjective intent the 
defendant may allege for the offenses at issue* ££. State v. 
Arrovo. 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah App. 1989) (categorizing "actual 
state of mind of the officer" as irrelevant in determining 
whether automobile stop was pretextual; objective evaluation 
required instead)• Finally, as explained above, in cases like 
the instant one our perspective is narrow rather than expansive. 
We conclude that Strader#s conduct in giving the incorrect 
name and a falsified driver's license to Officer Randall is not 
incident to his possession of a controlled substance or, for that 
matter, to his accomplishing the theft of the saw. 
The only possible nexus between the crimes is an intent to 
avoid arrest on the other charges by giving false identification. 
Yet Strader was already detained by Officer Randall, who had 
observed his involvement in what appeared to be theft activities, 
at the time he gave false information. His identity was 
inconsequential to his imminent arrest for theft under whatever 
name he cared to use. Use of a false identity might have 
deflected further problems by way of outstanding warrants, 
driving on a revoked license, or other similar legal 
entanglements, but it would have no bearing on the officer's 
investigative focus on Strader as the perpetrator of a theft 
committed in the officer's presence. Strader's suspicious 
activities at the construction site and possession of drugs were 
not absolved, explained, or mitigated by giving the officer his 
brother's name or an obviously altered driver's license.9 Also, 
8. (...continued) 
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (examining totality of 
circumstances to determine whether articulable facts support 
reasonable suspicion); Citv of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 
1388 (Utah App. 1994) (basing the determination of exigent 
circumstances for warrantless search on totality of 
circumstances). 
9. In State v. Cornish. 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per 
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court held that a crime committed to 
avoid arrest for a prior crime cannot always be considered as 
part of the same criminal episode. The Court later noted that 
"our failure to announce that such conduct always warrants 
joinder does not preclude us from concluding that under some 
circumstances, joinder may be proper." State v. Germonto. 868 
P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993). 
(continued...) 
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the fact he was driving a car with incorrect license plates and 
that he had a forged driver's license at hand seem to indicate 
that obscuring his identity was an ongoing and routine course of 
conduct with Strader and not specifically done to somehow further 
his theft or drug possession activities• 
Objectively viewing all of the facts and circumstances in a 
narrowly focused way, we conclude that because there was no 
common criminal purpose, the offense of false identification and 
the other offenses with which Strader was charged, in particular 
the drug offense to which he pled guilty, are not part of the 
same criminal episode for purposes of the issue before us. 
9. (...continued) 
In the instant case, the outcome may well have been 
different if the facts had created a stronger nexus of purpose 
between the offenses. Consider the following two hypothetical 
scenarios: In the first, Officer Randall finds a circular saw on 
the back seat with a bill of sale made out to "Joe Carpenter" and 
Strader tells him that his name is "Joe Carpenter." In the 
second hypothetical, Officer Randall observes Strader, carrying a 
circular saw, leave a construction site marked with a large sign 
reading "Beagle Boys Construction.91 Strader tells him his name 
is "Bart Beagle." In both scenarios, the false identification 
would be closely connected with the alleged theft activities 
because Strader, in order to evade arrest, would be using the 
names as a means to explain his legitimate presence at the 
construction site and/or his lawful possession of the saw. By 
contrast, in the instant case, Strader's use of his brother's 
identity and that of Earl Nesbitt did nothing to explain away his 
apparently unlawful taking of the saw. 
The drug offense is yet a further step removed from 
Straders giving false information. But for his arrest under 
whatever name on theft charges, he would not have been arrested 
and his car searched and the syringes found. Nonetheless, one 
can envision a more purposeful connection between giving false 
information and possession of a controlled substance, as in this 
hypothetical situation: Officer Randall observes syringes in 
Strader's car, then asks Strader for identification. Strader 
produces a counterfeit police shield and introduces himself as 
"Earl Nesbitt, undercover agent with the Metro Narcotics Strike 
Force." In this scenario, he would employ a false identity in 
order to create a legitimate reason for possessingja controlled 
substance. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the purposes relevant here, the offense of false 
identification for which Strader was prosecuted was not part of 
the same criminal episode as the offense of possession of a 
controlled substance because there was no common criminal 
objective. Therefore, sections 76-1-402(2) and -403(1) do not 
bar the subsequent prosecution proceedings in district court. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
GregoryTC. Orme, Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, £oage 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge (concurring in result): 
In my view, the Scope of Analysis section of the main 
opinion is not only unnecessary to the result but analytically 
flawed. Strader is seeking to avail himself of the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. SS 76-1-401 to -405 (1990); he is nafe claiming 
that he was "twice put in jeopardy11 within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 
Moreover, Strader#s reliance upon cases in which the 
defendant is contesting joinder is totally appropriate* There is 
nothing in the statutes upon which Strader relies that suggests 
an "expansive" interpretation where the government is pursuing 
joinder or a "very narrow perspective" where the defendant is 
attempting to benefit from the statutory provisions.2 Thus, the 
majority's application of a double standard for interpreting the 
definition of a single criminal episode set out in section 76-1-
401 is unnecessarily confusing, especially where, as here, either 
1. See note four of the main opinion. 
2. Even if it is assumed that such an approach is appropriate 
to an analysis at the constitutional level* 
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interpretation would yield the same result. See State v. 
Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 59-60 (Utah 1993) (applying "expansive11 
interpretation, yet requiring nonetheless, as in the case at bar, 
that the theory for joinder "posit[] a single objective 
throughout the whole [criminal] episode") (emphasis added). 
As stated in the terse, straightforward analysis in the 
Application to Facts section of the main opinion, Strader's crime 
of giving false information to a police officer is simply not 
part of a single criminal episode involving the theft and drug 
offenses under the definition set out in section 76-1-401. 
Therefore, it is unnecessary to meld a constitutional analysis 
with statutory interpretation, even if that exercise were 
logip«xiy Suggested by the statute. 
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ADDENDUM B 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-401 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Wright, 745 ?2d 447 (Utah 
1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. Id. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal C.J.S. — 22 CJJS. Criminal Law ( 203. 
Law I 227. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law a* 152. 
76-1-305. Lesser included offense for which period of limi-
tations has run. 
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which the period of 
limitations has not run and the defendant should be found guilty of a lesser 
offense for which the period of limitations has run, the finding of the lesser 
and included offense against which the statute of limitations has run shall not 
be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-305, enacted by L. 
1973, eh. 196, I 76-1-305. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am Jur. 2d Criminal CJ.S. — 22 CJJS. Criminal Law § 196. 
Law t 225. Key Numbers* — Criminal Law *» 145V2. 
PART 4 
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE 
•JEOPARDY 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of 
offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single crimi-
nal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident 
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of 
Section 77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in crimi-
nal proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 79-1-401, enacted by I* cited in this section, was repealed in 1980. For 
1973, eh. 196, I 76-1-401; 1975, ch. 47, I 1. the present comparable provision, see Rule 9, 
Compiler's Notes. — Section 77*21-31, R Crim. P. 
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76-1-402 CRIMINAL CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Conduct constituting single crime. 
Conduct constituting separate 
—Property pawned separately. 
Traffic ofTenses. 
Cited. 
Conduct coftetHutbig single crime. 
Retention of stolen property of different indi-
viduals is a single act and a single offense if 
evidence shows that the items were retained 
simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items 
were the subject of a previous prosecution for 
related offenses, a second prosecution was pre-
cluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 
1983). 
Conduct constituting separate crimes. 
Where defendant committed a robbery in one 
county, and later, in another county some 66 
miles away, picked up two hitchhikers and de-
cided to kidnap them aa hostages, the differ-
ence in time, location, and the criminal objec-
tives of robbery and kidnapping rendered the 
conduct separate crimes rather than one single 
criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 
1206 (UUh 1977). 
The unlawful taking of a vehicle and the 
failure to stop at the command of a police offi-
cer were two separate offenses, and not a single 
episode, because the two offenses occurred a 
day apart and the criminal objective in the un-
lawful taking was to obtain possession while 
the criminal objective in the failure to stop was 
to avoid arrest for a traffic violation. State v. 
Cornish, 671 P.2d 677 (Utah 1977). 
Defendant's actions did not constitute a "sin-
gle criminal episode" since he committed two 
separate burglaries by breaking into two sepa-
rate buildings within an apertment complex, 
even though the burglaries were only 20 
minutes apart. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 
(UUh 1985). 
—Property pawned separately. 
Where property was stolen and defendant re-
ceived and pawned it on three separate days 
spread over a period of 18 days, the offenses did 
not arise out of a single criminal episode. State 
v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (UUh 1986). 
Traffic offenses. 
This section does not prevent the prosecution 
of a drunk driving charge under ft 41-6-44 af-
ter the defendant has pleaded guilty to driving 
without a license, without a registration certif-
icate and without a safety sticker, Rince the 
ciUtions charge separate offenses entirely un-
related to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606 
P.2d 253 (UUh 1980). 
Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 
(UUh 1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P 2d 89 
(UUh Ct. App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749 
P.2d 631 (UUh 1988); Slate v. Fletcher, 751 
P.2d 805 (UUh Ct App. 1988); State v. Ortega, 
761 P2d 1138 (UUh 1988); State v. Johnson, 
115 UUh Adv. Rep. 6 (1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jttr. 2d. 
Law i 20. 
21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal CJ&. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law ft 14. 
Key Numbers, — Criminal Law *» 29. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all sepa-
rate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal 
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single crimi-
nal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
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(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included of-
fense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History: C. 1983, 76-1-402, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-1-402; L. 1974, ch. 32, ft 2. 
Croes-fleferencc*. — Computer Crime* Act 
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violat-
ing another statute, ft 76-6-704. 
ANALYSIS 
"Act." 
Judgment entered for included offense after re-
versal of conviction. 
Jurisdiction of a single court. 
Lesser included offense. 
—Aggravated assault. 
—Aggravated robbery. 
—Attempted homicide. 
—Forcible sexual abuse. 
—Instructions. 
—Joy riding. 
—Manslaughter. 
—Negligent homicide. 
—Thea. 
Misdemeanor and felony charges. 
Separate offenses. 
—Automobile violations. 
—Burglary and larc«*ny. 
—Remoteness in time. 
—Sex offenses. 
Cited. 
"Act" 
"Act" as used in Subsection (1) includes not 
only volitional acts of a defendant, but also the 
number of victims, as each is acted upon by a 
Double jeopardy prohibited for tame offense, 
UUh Const, Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const., 
Amend. V; ft 77-1-6. 
defendant State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Judgment entered for Included offense af-
ter reversal of conviction. 
Where there was insufficient evidence to 
support defendant's conviction for second de-
gree murder, but there was sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the included offense 
of manslaughter, Supreme Court, pursuant to 
this section, vacated and set aside the convic-
tion of second degree murder on appeal and 
entered a judgment of conviction for the in-
cluded offense of manslaughter. State v. 
Bindmp, 655 P 2d 674 (Utah 1982). 
Evidence of depraved indifference to the risk 
of death was insufficient to support defendant's 
conviction of second degree murder, but there 
was sufficient evidence of recklessness to sup-
port a conviction of the included offense of 
manslaughter; the Supreme Court, pursuant to 
Subsection (5), remanded the case to the trial 
court with directions to set aside the verdict 
and to enter a judgment of conviction for man-
slaughter. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 
(UUh 1985). 
Jurisdiction of a single court 
Plea of guilty to two charges in justice of the 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
13 
76-1-403 CRIMINAL CODE 
the entering did not include and was indepen- v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1987), 
dent of the larceny; each offense required dif- cert, granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988). 
ferent acts and former 9 76-1-23 did not pre-
 mmamw n 
elude conviction on both burglary and larceny ~~2? " T * , , - •» i . .i J J 
char^ SUU ». Jone* 13I Utah 2d 36. 368 . ^ f ™ ' " £ * rf * * £ P»~l™«»" P'^«««« 
P 2d 2152 rififi9) * P*111'* contact, and the former act was in no 
u w w
- way necessary to the latter act, the two acts 
—Remoteness In tine. wer* n o t P«rt o f t h e Hsame set" and could sup-
Where defendant was charged with theft of P°rt ) w 0 c o u n l 8 <* aWfravated sexual assault 
an operable motor vehicle which occurred in b a ? ~ 0 " 8 e P a r t t * •<*? of forcible sexual abuse 
1981 and possession of a stolen vehicle occur- ?"J/7!S5i m y *' *' ? 8 ° P 
ring in 1986. because of the remoteness in time 1 2 3 3 (1989>-
of the two offenses. Subsection (3) cannot bar Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 
convictions of both offenses, as that subsection (Utah 1986); State v. Haga. 735 P.2d 44 (Utah 
is limited to and defined by "separate offenses 1987); State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 
arising out of a single criminal episode." State 1988); State v. Tuttle, 780 P. 2d 1203 (1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments CJ .a — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law I 14. 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal A.L.R. — Seizure or detention for purpose of 
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137. committing rape, robbery, or similar offense as 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi- constituting separate crime of kidnaping, 43 
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L A L R 3d 699. 
Rev. 177. Lesser-related state offense instructions: 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal modern statu*. 60 A.L.R.4th 1081. 
Law 9 20. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law e» 29. 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prose-
cution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a differ-
ent offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should 
have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; 
and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
" (i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be estab-
lished to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not 
guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient 
evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense 
is an acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has 
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a 
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
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(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination 
takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, 
and takes place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defen-
dant, or, if the jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, 
termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is 
necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in confor-
mity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the 
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict revers-
ible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable 
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
History: C. 19S3, 76-1-403, enacted by L. 
1*73, ch. 196, I 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, I 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
n A -A . u ., . , , This section does not mandate dismissal if 
Conduct constituting single dime.
 e w m t § ^ ^ properly severed. Thus, where s 
Cited C°Un magistrate severed counts "to promote justice-
snd the district court later refused to rejoin 
Conduct constituting single crime. them for the same reason sfter defendant hsd 
Retention of stolen property of different IncH- fc^ convicted on one of the counts, the esse 
vidusls is a single set snd a single offense
 w a § noi ^ ^ « lhouid h«ve been tried under 
when evidence shows thst the items were re-
 § 7 6 . M 0 2 . - State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Uteh 
tamed simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen 1907) 
items were the subject of s previous prosecu-
tion for related offenses, s second prosecution CHed In 8tate v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 
wss precluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (fjuh 1987) 
(Utah 1983). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal son as bar to subsequent prosecution for rob-
Lsw I 243 et seq. bery of another person committed at the same 
CJS. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law I 208. time, 51 A.L.R.3d 693. 
A.L.R. — Prosecution for robbery of one per- Key Numbers. — Criminal Lew •» 161. 
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — Prosecution in other 
jurisdiction barring prosecution in state. 
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses 
within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction, 
federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subse-
quent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined 
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Rule 9 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 310 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1993, designated as 
"(a)" and rewrote the existing provisions, delet-
ing ''other than an infraction" after "offense," 
and added Subdivisions (b) to (e). 
Cross-References. — Counsel for indigent 
defendants, § 77-32-1 et seq. 
Defense costs in criminal actions, convicted 
defendants may be ordered to pay, § 77-32a-l 
et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Determination of indigency. 
—Appeal. 
Self-representation. 
Determination of indigency. 
—Appeal. 
The determination of indigency is a question 
offset to be determined by the trial court; once 
that determination has been made, it is enti-
tled to the same presumptions of correctness as 
other trial court findings and determinations; 
therefore, the person attacking that finding 
has the burden to prove it is in error. Webster 
v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978). 
Self-representation. 
Because the exercise of the right to defend 
oneself in a criminal prosecution necessarily 
constitutes a waiver of the important right to 
professional counsel, trial courts have an affir-
mative duty to determine that a defendant who 
chooses self-representation does so knowingly 
and intelligently. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1991). 
Trial court did not err in allowing defendant 
to represent himself, after the court properly 
inquired into defendant's wish to represent 
himself, and properly took defendant's ques-
tionable mental health into account in consid-
ering the request. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1991). 
The choice to represent oneself does not auto-
matically give defendant access to research re-
sources enjoyed by professional counsel. State 
v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, £36 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). 
A foreign-national defendant had a constitu-
tional right to defend himself if he chose to do 
so, notwithstanding his limited understanding 
of English and of the U.S. judicial system; the 
trial court deprived him of that right when it 
applied an incorrect legal standard, consider-
ing the defendant's best interests and his tech-
nical ability to manage hi6 own defense. More-
over, because the court's determination that 
the defendant could not knowingly and intelli-
gently choose self-representation was not sup-
ported either by the facts or by any meaningful 
inquiry into the defendant's ability to under-
stand the risks of self-representation, the case 
was remanded to allow defendant to represent 
himself. State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah 
Ct App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepre-
sentation, or failure to advise, of immigration 
consequences of guilty plea — state cases, 65 
A.L.R.4th 719. 
What constitutes assertion of right to coun-
sel following Miranda warnings — federal 
80 A.L.R. Fed. 622. 
Utah Law Review. — Judicial Jabber-
wocky or Uniform Constitutional Protection? 
Strickland v. Washington and National Stan-
dards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Claims, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 723. 
A.L.R. — Relief available for violation of 
right to counsel at sentencing in state criminal 
trial, 65 A.L.R.4th 183. 
Rule 9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 201, § 2 re- Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
pealed former i 77-35-9, and thus this rule, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (applying § 77-8a-l 
effective April 23,1990. For present compara- instead of this rule, finding that the repeal of 
ble provisions, aee § 77«8a-l. See also State v. the statute operated to repeal the rule). 
Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in single 
court 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informa-
tions charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of state 
laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances and arising from a sin-
gle criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest 
possible penalty of all the offenses charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not 
be separated except by order of the court and for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicating the com-
plaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, 
and a single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses. 
